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a b s t r a c t
It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a
unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
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This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).l1. Introduction
While rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent
type distributions are quite interesting, basic issues such as
existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
(PSNE) have been addressed only partially.1 Indeed, previous work
on the issue of existence focused either on symmetric contests
(Fey, 2008; Ryvkin, 2010) or on the case of a continuous technology
(Wasser, 2013a,b). Moreover, little general was known about the
uniqueness of the equilibrium.
✩ For useful suggestions and comments, I would like to thank Federico Quartieri
and an anonymous referee.
E-mail addresses: christian.ewerhart@iew.uzh.ch,
christian.ewerhart@econ.uzh.ch.
1 Generally, in games of incomplete information, the PSNE refers to strategic
optimization at the ex-ante stage (Athey, 2001). See Section 2 for a formal definition
and the Appendix for further discussion.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.08.019
0165-1765/© 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access artic
0/).Below, it is shown that in any rent-seeking contest with inde-
pendent and continuous types, there exists a unique PSNE.2 The
contest success function merely needs to be of the logit form with
concave impact functions, and players’ private informationmay re-
late to either marginal costs or valuations. The result holds even
when the contest is ex-ante asymmetric,3 so that the equilibrium
may entail inactive types.4 Moreover, no restriction is imposed on
the shape of the type distributions. Generally, existence ensures
consistency of a model, whereas uniqueness strengthens numeri-
cal analyses, theoretical results, and experimental findings.
2 Uniquenessmeans here that for any given player, any two PSNE strategies differ
atmost on a null set. This corresponds to the strongest form of uniqueness for PSNE.
3 Ex-ante asymmetry may be reflected, e.g., in heterogeneous distributions of
marginal costs, heterogeneous distributions of valuations, or in heterogeneous
economies of scale.
4 Wärneryd (2003) explicitly allows for inactive types in a common-value setting.
e under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.
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the set-up. Existence is dealt with in Section 3. Section 4 discusses
uniqueness. A numerical illustration can be found in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes. An Appendix contains technical lemmas.
2. Set-up
There are N ≥ 2 players. Each player i = 1, . . . ,N observes
a signal (or type) ci, drawn from an interval Di = [c i, c i], where
0 < c i < c i. Signals are independent across players. Moreover,
player i does not observe the signal cj of any other player j ≠ i. The
distribution function of player i’s signal is denoted by Fi = Fi(ci).
Each player i chooses a level of activity yi ≥ 0 at cost gi(yi).
It is assumed that gi(0) = 0, and that gi is twice continuously
differentiable on R+, with g ′i > 0 on R++, and g
′′
i ≥ 0. Player i’s
payoff isΠi(yi, y−i, ci) = pi(yi, y−i) − cigi(yi), where pi(yi, y−i) =
yi/(yi + j≠i yj) if yi + j≠i yj > 0, and pi(yi, y−i) = 1/N
otherwise.5
A strategy for player i is a (measurable) mapping σi : Di →
R+. Denote by Si the set of strategies for player i. For a profile
σ−i = {σj}j≠i ∈ S−i = j≠i Sj, and a type ci ∈ Di, player
i’s interim expected payoff is given by Π i(yi, σ−i, ci) =

D−i Πi
(yi, σ−i(c−i), ci)dF−i(c−i), where D−i = j≠i Dj, σ−i(c−i) = {σj
(cj)}j≠i, and dF−i(c−i) = j≠i dFj(cj). A Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium (BNE) is a profile σ ∗ = {σ ∗i }Ni=1 ∈ S =
N
i=1 Si such that
Π i(σ
∗
i (ci), σ
∗
−i, ci) ≥ Π i(yi, σ ∗−i, ci) for any i = 1, . . . ,N , any
ci ∈ Di, and any yi ≥ 0. A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) is
a profile σ ∗ ∈ S such that for any i = 1, . . . ,N , and for almost any
ci ∈ Di, the inequality Π i(σ ∗i (ci), σ ∗−i, ci) ≥ Π i(yi, σ ∗−i, ci) holds
for any yi ≥ 0.6
3. Existence
This section builds on prior work by Fey (2008), Ryvkin (2010)
and Wasser (2013a). Existence is shown first for the ε-constrained
contest, for ε > 0, in which each player i = 1, . . . ,N may use only
strategies with values in [ε,∞).
Lemma 3.1. There is a level of activity E > 0 such that, for any
sufficiently small ε > 0, there exists a BNE σ ε in the ε-constrained
contest such that each player i’s strategy σ εi is continuous, monotone,
and bounded by E.
Proof. Since costs are strictly increasing and convex, there is an
E > 0 such that any yi > E is suboptimal. Moreover, Π i
exhibits decreasing differences in yi and ci. Hence, existence of
a monotone PSNE σ ε in the ε-constrained contest follows from
Athey (2001, Cor. 2.1). Note now that type ci’s ε-constrained
problem, maxyi≥ε Π i(yi,σ ε−i, ci), has a unique solution yi = σ εi (ci).
Indeed, ifσ ε−i(c−i) ≠ 0with positive probability, thenΠ i(·,σ ε−i, ci)
is strictly concave on [ε, E], while otherwise, the unique solution
is yi = ε. Hence, σ εi (ci) = σ εi (ci) with probability one, for any i =
1, . . . ,N . This implies that σ εi (ci) is also type ci’s best response to
σ ε−i, for any i = 1, . . . ,N , and any ci ∈ Di. Thus, σ ε = (σ ε1 , . . . , σ εN)
is a BNE in the ε-constrained contest. Clearly, each σ εi is
monotone. Finally, continuity of σ εi follows from Berge’s Theorem,
asΠ i(·, σ ε−i, ·) is continuous on the compact set [ε, E] × Di. 
5 As usual, a simple change of variables allows to capture other types of contest
success functions and other forms of uncertainty, e.g., about valuations. Cf. Ryvkin
(2010).
6 As shown in the Appendix, this amounts to the standard definition.Consider now a sequence {εm}∞m=1 such that εm ↘ 0, and select
a BNE σm in the εm-constrained contest for each m ∈ N, with the
properties specified in the previous lemma.
Lemma 3.2. The sequence {σm}∞m=1 has a uniformly converging
subsequence.
Proof. In view of Lemma 3.1 and the Theorem of Arzelà–Ascoli,
it suffices to find a λ > 0 such that σmi has everywhere a slope
exceeding−λ for anym ∈ N and any i. In terms of the transformed
choice variable yλi = yi+λci, a type ci’s expected payoff in σm may
be written as
Π
λ
i (y
λ
i , σ
m
−i, ci) =

D−i
(yλi − λci)dF−i(c−i)
yλi − λci +

j≠i
σmj (cj)
− cigi(yλi − λci), (1)
provided that yλi −λci = yi > 0. Hence, for λ sufficiently large, the
cross-partial
∂2Π
λ
i
∂yλi ∂ci
=

D−i
2λ

j≠i
σmj (cj)dF−i(c−i)
yi +
j≠i
σmj (cj)
3 − g ′i (yi)+ ciλg ′′i (yi)  
≥0
(2)
≥ 2λ
NE

D−i

j≠i
σmj (cj)dF−i(c−i)
yi +
j≠i
σmj (cj)
2 − g ′i (yi) (3)
≥

2λc i
NE
− 1

g ′i (yi) (4)
is seen to be positive in the range of ci where yi = σmi (ci) > 0.
Thus, for λ large, yλi is weakly increasing in ci, which proves the
claim. 
By Lemma 3.2, onemay assumew.l.o.g. that {σm}∞m=1 converges
uniformly to some σ ∗ ∈ S. Next, it is shown that in σ ∗, at least one
player is active with probability one.
Lemma 3.3. There is some player i such that σ ∗i (ci) > 0 with
probability one.
Proof. Suppose that for each i, there is a set Di ⊆ Di of positive
measure such that σ ∗i (ci) = 0 for all ci ∈ Di. Then, by uniform
convergence, there exists, for any ε > 0, anm0 = m0(ε) such that
σmi (ci) < ε for any i, any ci ∈ Di, and any m ≥ m0. But, from the
Kuhn–Tucker condition for type ci in the εm-constrained contest,
0 ≥

D−i

j≠i
σmj (cj)dF−i(c−i)
σmi (ci)+

j≠i
σmj (cj)
2 − cig ′i (E), (5)
where D−i = j≠iDj. Integrating over Di, and subsequently
summing over i = 1, . . . ,N , one obtains
0 ≥

D
(N − 1)dF(c)
N
i=1
σmi (ci)
−
N
i=1
g ′i (E)

Di
cidFi(ci), (6)
where D = Ni=1Di and dF(c) = Ni=1 dFi(ci). For ε small,
however, this is impossible. 
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Theorem 3.4. In the unconstrained contest, σ ∗ is a PSNE in continu-
ous and monotone strategies.
Proof. Fix a player i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}. For anym ∈ N, sinceσm is a BNE
in the εm-constrained contest,Π i(σmi (ci), σ
m
−i, ci) ≥ Π i(yi, σm−i, ci)
for any ci ∈ Di and any yi ≥ εm. Therefore, if the event σ ∗−i(c−i) = 0
is null, lettingm →∞ impliesΠ i(σ ∗i (ci), σ ∗−i, ci) ≥ Π i(yi, σ ∗−i, ci)
via Lebesgue’s theorem, for any ci ∈ Di and any yi > 0.
Suppose next that σ ∗−i(c−i) = 0 with positive probability. Then,
by Lemma 3.3, σ ∗i (ci) > 0 with probability one. Let ci ∈ Di with
σ ∗i (ci) > 0. If yi > 0, then the argument proceeds as above. To
complete the proof, note that Π i(·, σ ∗−i, ci) is l.s.c., so that yi = 0
cannot be the only profitable deviation for ci. 
4. Uniqueness
Consider two PSNE σ ∗ and σ ∗∗ in the unconstrained contest
such that, for some player i, the event σ ∗i (ci) ≠ σ ∗∗i (ci) has positive
probability. Then, as noted below, σ ∗ and σ ∗∗ must differ in an
essential way for at least two players.
Lemma 4.1. There are players i ≠ j such that each of the independent
events σ ∗i (ci) ≠ σ ∗∗i (ci) and σ ∗j (cj) ≠ σ ∗∗j (cj) has positive
probability.
Proof. Suppose there is some i such that σ ∗−i(c−i) = σ ∗∗−i (c−i)
with probability one. Then, Π i(·, σ ∗−i, ci) = Π i(·, σ ∗∗−i , ci) for any
ci ∈ Di. Thus, σ ∗i (ci) = σ ∗∗i (ci) with probability one, which is a
contradiction. 
The following is the second main result of this paper.
Theorem 4.2. The PSNE in the unconstrained contest is unique.
Proof. Following Rosen (1965), write σ ∗,s = (1− s)σ ∗ + sσ ∗∗ for
0 ≤ s ≤ 1, and consider
Φs =
N
i=1

Di
π i(σ
∗,s, ci)

σ ∗∗i (ci)− σ ∗i (ci)

dFi(ci) (7)
for s = 0, 1, where π i(σ , ci) = ∂Π i(σi(ci), σ−i, ci)/∂yi denotes
type ci’s marginal expected payoff at a profile σ ∈ S.7 From the
Kuhn–Tucker conditions, π i(σ ∗, ci) ≤ 0 for almost any ci ∈ Di;
moreover, σ ∗i (ci) = 0 if π i(σ ∗, ci) < 0. It follows that Φ0 ≤
0, and similarly, Φ1 ≥ 0. To provoke a contradiction, it will
be shown now that Φ1 − Φ0 < 0. Denote by πi(σ , ci, c−i) =
∂Πi(σi(ci), σ−i(c−i), ci)/∂yi type ci’s marginal ex-post payoff at
σ ∈ S, when facing c−i ∈ D−i. Then, by LemmaA.2 in the Appendix,
Φ1 − Φ0 =

D
N
i=1
(πi(σ
∗∗, ci, c−i)− πi(σ ∗, ci, c−i))zi(ci)dF(c) (8)
=

D
N
i=1
 1
0
∂πi(σ
∗,s, ci, c−i)
∂s
zi(ci)ds

dF(c), (9)
where zi(ci) = σ ∗∗i (ci) − σ ∗i (ci). An application of the chain rule
delivers
∂πi(σ
∗,s, ci, c−i)
∂s
=
N
j=1
∂2pi(σ
∗,s
i (ci), σ
∗,s
−i (c−i))
∂yi∂yj
zj(cj)
− ci g ′′i (σ ∗,si (ci))  
≥0
zi(ci), (10)
7 It is shown in the Appendix thatΦ0 andΦ1 are well-defined.for any i, any ci ∈ Di, and any c−i ∈ D−i. It follows that
Φ1 − Φ0 ≤

D
 1
0

N
i=1
N
j=1
∂2pi(σ
∗,s
i (ci), σ
∗,s
−i (c−i))
∂yi∂yj
× zi(ci)zj(cj)

ds

dF(c). (11)
One can verify, however, that
N
i=1
N
j=1
∂2pi(yi, y−i)
∂yi∂yj
zizj (12)
= −
N
i=1
2Y−i
Y 3
z2i +
N
i=1

j≠i
Y − 2Y−i
Y 3
zizj (13)
= − 2
Y 3
N
i=1
Y−iz2i −
2
Y 3
N
i=1

j>i

k≠i,j
ykzizj (14)
= − 1
Y 3
N
i=1
Y−iz2i −
1
Y 3
N
i=1
N
j=1

k≠i,j
ykzizj (15)
= − 1
Y 3
N
i=1
(z2i Y−i + yiZ2−i) ≤ 0 (16)
for any (y1, . . . , yN) ∈ RN+ \ {0} and any (z1, . . . , zN) ∈ RN ,
where Y = Ni=1 yi, Y−i = j≠i yj, and Z−i = j≠i zj. Moreover,
z2i Y−i = zi(ci)2

j≠i σ
∗,s
j (cj) is positive for any s ∈ (0, 1) if
σ ∗i (ci) ≠ σ ∗∗i (ci) and σ ∗j (cj) ≠ σ ∗∗j (cj) for some j ≠ i. Thus, by
Lemma 4.1,Φ1 − Φ0 < 0. 
5. Numerical illustration
Fig. 1 shows PSNE strategies in a two-player lottery contest,
where types are distributed uniformly on D1 = [0.01, 1.01] and
D2 = [0.51, 5.51], respectively. Note that player 2 remains inac-
tive for c2 > c∗2 ≈ 4.21.
6. Concluding remarks
While this paper has focused on the existence and uniqueness
of a PSNE in asymmetric rent-seeking contests, it follows from the
proofs that also any of the BNE studied by Fey (2008) and Ryvkin
(2010) is unique.
Appendix. Technical lemmas
Lemma A.1. A profile σ ∗ ∈ S is a PSNE in the unconstrained contest
if and only if

DΠi(σ
∗
i (ci), σ
∗
−i(c−i), ci)dF(c) ≥

DΠi(σi(ci), σ ∗−i
(c−i), ci)dF(c) for any i = 1, . . . ,N, and anyσi ∈ Si.
Proof. Let σ ∗ be a PSNE, and consider a deviationσi ∈ Si for some
player i. Then, Π i(σ ∗i (ci), σ
∗
−i, yi) ≥ Π i(σi(ci), σ ∗−i, ci) for almost
any ci ∈ Di. Integrating over Di, the assertion follows via Fubini’s
theorem. Conversely, suppose that σ ∗ is not a PSNE. Then, there is a
player i and a setDi ⊆ Di of positivemeasure such thatσ ∗i (ci) is not
a best response to σ ∗−i for ci, for any ci ∈ Di. Defineσi(ci) as ci’s best
response to σ ∗−i if it exists; otherwise as σ
∗
i (ci)/2 if σ
∗
i (ci) > 0, and
as pr{σ ∗−i(c−i) = 0}/(2c ig ′i (E)) if σ ∗i (ci) = 0. Thenσi is a profitable
deviation. 
Lemma A.2. Let σ ∗ ∈ S be a PSNE in the unconstrained contest.
Then, for almost any ci ∈ Di, the function πi(σ ∗, ci, ·) is integrable,
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
D−i πi(σ
∗, ci, c−i)dF−i(c−i). Moreover, π i(σ ∗, ·)
is integrable.
Proof. The first claim is obvious if σ ∗i (ci) > 0 for almost any
ci ∈ Di. Suppose that σ ∗i (ci) = 0 with positive probability.
Then, by Lemma 3.3, the event σ ∗−i(c−i) = 0 is null. Take some
c−i ∈ D−i with σ ∗−i(c−i) ≠ 0. Then, for any ci ∈ Di, by con-
cavity, the difference quotient Πi(yi, σ ∗−i(c−i), ci)/yi is monotone
increasing as yi ↘ 0, with limit πi(σ ∗, ci, c−i). Since also Πi(yi,
σ ∗−i(c−i), ci)/yi ≥ −c ig ′i (E), the first claim follows from Levi’s
theorem. The second claim follows from Lebesgue’s theorem, be-
causeπ i(σ ∗, ·) ≤ 0 from theKuhn–Tucker conditions, andbecause
π i(σ
∗, ·) ≥ −c ig ′i (E), as above. References
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